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Abstract 
Flood storage involves creating sacrificial land for water to purposefully inundate protect land 
downstream. Obtaining the right or co-operation to flood on private property remains a 
challenge. This paper based on empirical qualitative research with 14 key stakeholders involved 
in the practice of gaining land to flood in England and Wales the different forms of financial and 
economic approach that might be used to facilitate this right. Expropriation of land, one off-
payment, annual single payment and flood event losses compensation were explored. 
Availability of funding as compensation is the main driver for landowner adoption of flood 
storage schemes. Three funding approaches were revealed; flowage easement, full land 
purchase and Agricultural Schemes funding diffuse storage. Rather than attempting to gain 
partnerships between spatially dislocated stakeholders in upper storage and lower impacted 
catchments success resides on the storage land and persuading landowner co-operation. A 
clear enforced legal framework of ownership of land and funding mechanisms is also viewed as 
essential.   
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Introduction 
Natural disasters are acutely experienced at a local level requiring approaches specific to the 
local circumstances where sustainable land management is an effective disaster risk reduction 
tool (Cambell et al., 2012). The spatial and temporal variability of flooding overlay socially and 
economically disparate populations and stakeholders (Howe & White, 2001). Policy drivers for 
inclusion of such stakeholders in decisions is informed by formal legislative requirements such 
as the Water Framework Directive (European Union 2000) the Aarhus Convention on 
stakeholder engagement and the EU Habitats and Birds directive (European Communities ECC 
1992) translated into the Government Making Space for Water implementation (Defra 2005). 
The later document perhaps finds greatest resonance with flood storage approaches the focus 
of this paper.  
This paper outlines the financial mechanisms and stakeholder management approaches that 
have been employed in England and Wales in order to secure land for the purpose of temporary 
upstream flood retention otherwise termed flood storage. Contributing to the continuing UK 
debate on upstream storage the paper pulls together the range of financial mechanisms and 
implementation techniques revealed from empirical social research. The paper does not set out 
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the current context as the research was undertaken a number of years ago (2013) but presents 
in the absence of similar review literature conveniently summarised approaches for further 
discussion and future reference. In addition the  focus is on the implementation techniques, a 
revealed gap in the literature, for encouraging landowner participation as seen through the eyes 
of those who regularly have to negotiate the terms for acquiring the land. The paper provides a 
policy and flood risk management context for flood storage before introducing the empirical 
research and key findings concluding with a brief discussion. 
 
Flood storage can be defined as the temporary detention of floodwater. By capturing and storing 
the flood water peak flow the extreme volume is not passed downstream to cause flood 
inundation but gradually released when water levels have fallen. Flood storage is one of the 
many options used in flood risk management and has recently received greater interest at the 
European scale in response to the aforementioned challenges in sustainable flood risk 
management it’s associated policy and at a national UK scale in response to large scale flood 
events. Flood risk and the management of that risk is well established in the UK utilising a range 
of physical and behavioural mitigation approaches facilitated by economic and financial 
incentives (Environment Agency, 2009).  
Environmental Change and Property Rights 
Where the principle of flooding areas with expected lower losses (farmland) instead of high 
values areas (urban) is acceptable, obtaining the right to flood on private property remains a 
challenge. The role of flood risk management is to in part attend to managing injustices and 
minimising such inequalities. Johnson et al. (2007) highlighted the challenges of implementing 
flood risk management policy strategies in England in relation to ‘just, fair and equitable’ 
decisions in the allocation of restricted national funds sourced from tax payers’ money. While 
introducing a Partnership Funding mechanism provides the potential additional private, 
commercial and local authority resources the control of planning and implementation in relation 
to flood storage schemes remains within the governing and managing organisations and 
influenced by their particular agendas. Flood mitigation that challenges property rights in the 
form of flood storage creation and the economic mechanisms to facilitate resolution to such 
challenges becomes an issue. 
In common law countries such as the UK, the clash between the expectations of holders of 
property rights in land and the disrespect of environmental changes for such rights is particularly 
evident (Resource Assessment Commission, 1993; Watson, 2015). When private property 
rights in land are commuted by current and climate-driven flooding on a much more frequent 
basis, the UK statutory protections of property (Bell, 2014) are drawn into question – who should 
pay to protect the private property or whom should compensation be sought for destruction of 
the land lying at the heart of the devalued property right. 
Before addressing the impact of such an environmental change upon property rights it is 
necessary to further unpack flood storage, which can be succinctly described as the temporary 
detention on land of water derived from flood events. For fluvial storage by capturing and storing 
3 
 
the flood water peak flow the extreme volume is not passed downstream to cause initial or 
further flood inundation but gradually released when water levels have fallen. Flood storage has 
been used in England as part of a land management strategy for many centuries.  In UK flood 
risk management it is typically used as one of a number of approaches on a catchment and 
achieves a reduction rather removal of the risk of flooding altogether. Storage can be combined 
with approaches that include physical and behavioural resistance and resilience measures.  
 
A flood storage scheme is composed of an area of land to hold water and structures to regulate 
the input and output of that water. The regulatory structures can be overspill banks and manual / 
automatic gates. There are two types of flood storage.’ On-line storage’ refers to where the river 
is not disconnected with the storage area but a damming structure or restriction causes water to 
back up to be stored upstream. ‘Offline flood storage’ is disconnected from the river either via 
flow structures or embankments that overspill purposefully (Hall et al.,1993). Also at a smaller 
scale natural flood infiltration and water flow reducing measures can be implemented and 
enhanced which collectively contribute to slowing the flow into watercourses.  
Approaches in implementation 
Dislocation between the upstream storage area and the downstream benefiting land or 
communities that means it is often difficult to justify to the upstream landowners to relinquish 
part or all of their property to participate in a storage scheme. That is a scheme that would 
involve the flooding of their land for beneficiaries they may feel little attachment to.  
While the Water Framework Directive falls short of addressing spatial planning and flood issues 
the specifics in developing arrangements between source and recipients with the inclusion of 
incentivisation has been highlighted. Haupter et al., (2005) develop a formula of compensation 
for burden sharing of the disadvantage upstream advantaging the downstream stakeholders. 
Further research has broadened exploration of the challenges involving upstream and 
downstream partnerships and revealed the complexities and limitations of developing such an 
approach (Thaler et al., 2015; Thaler, 2014). In fact such approaches are found to be difficult to 
fully achieve and relied on ‘forced’ co-operation between stakeholders.  
Programs resulting from the Floods Directive such as the Strategic Alliance for Water 
Management Actions provide guidance and tools for implementation and research further 
guidance in the physical assessment of water bodies including flood storage (water retention 
basins) (Yang et al 2012, Scholz and Yang, 2010). But little in the assessment of capabilities or 
approaches to engage stakeholders to implement approaches. There is recognition of the 
complexity and uncertainty surrounding this scale of implementation (Collins et al., 2007).  
It will be shown that the main form of compensation for upstream land owners, mainly farming 
landlords, is dependent on forecasting the likely impact on the current management of the land. 
The highly dynamic (seasonality, crop use, climate change, land drainage) and local nature 
(weather forecast uncertainty) of agricultural flood impacts introduces uncertainty in forecast 
compensation (O’Connell et al., 2007). A formula for estimating costs can be deduced but some 
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losses such as environmental stewardship may be revealed outside the assessment period 
(Morris and Brewin, 2014). 
At the smaller scale off-line storage Farm Integrated Runoff Management Plans (Quinn et al 
2007) utilise storage, infiltration, slowing and filtering of runoff on farms. Such features require 
maintenance to avoid reduced storage capacity (Verstraeten and Poesen, 1999). Approaches 
may slow the flow to downstream receptors enabling enhanced event responses thus reducing 
damages (Parrot et al. 2009). Wilkinson (2010) was unable to show a fixed amount of risk 
reduction but supported the approach to small rural and larger catchment flood management 
reducing downstream required standards of protection. 
For large scale flood storage the focus has been given primarily to the upstream stakeholders 
but invariably partnerships need to have formed or require development between them in order 
to come to agreements for the implementation of storage. While Frey, (2001) provides a 
strategic characterisation of approaches to engaging stakeholders in negotiation specific 
implementation guidance is found wanting. Partnership is ‘not just about managing resources 
but it is also fundamentally about managing relationships’ (Graham & Ernstson, 2012, p3). It is 
the successful financial processes and management of such relationships in implementing flood 
storage that is the focus of this paper. Even further the research reveals practical techniques for 
implementing such financial mechanisms. Different forms of financial mechanisms are found to 
be required including expropriation of land, one off-payment, annual single payments, flood 
event losses compensation. The UK contexts may not be directly transferable to other 
governance contexts but aspects of learning and considerations revealed from this research 
could be instructive elsewhere.  
Methodology 
In the absence of literature at the scale of detailing actual implementation practices of financial 
compensation approaches and in the development of negotiation relationships social research 
undertaken in February 2013 among relevant practitioners was utilised. The research involved 
initial exploratory discussions with practitioners already known to the researchers identifying 
relevant stakeholder organisations that represented the majority of schemes, different 
approaches to funding and development of flood storage in England and Wales. 13 qualitative 
semi-structured telephone interviews each lasting up to an hour were undertaken with 
representatives. This in-depth approach allowed for flexibility in questioning and probing of 
answers where exploration of issues was required (Gilbert, 2008). Key organisations identified 
were the Environment Agency (EA) England and EA Wales (now known as Natural Resources  
Wales), the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), the Staffordshire Wildlife Trust 
and Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council. At least two representatives were chosen from 
each organisation to explore credibility of comments. Selection of individuals was based on both 
their connection with specific flood storage projects and their differing insights at the policy, 
management and land negotiation levels of projects. With the respondents permission each 
interview was audio recorded and transcribed for later analysis where, descriptive themes were 
identified and explored. Where possible, as promised before interview, the anonymity of 
respondents has been maintained. A final interview was undertaken in May 2013 with the EA 
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where the key findings were presented to gain further insights, clarifications and as a final test of 
balance for future reporting. 
Interview Findings 
Key financial mechanisms were identified but a common response from all the respondents was 
that the availability of compensatory funding was the main driver for landowner adoption of flood 
storage schemes in England and Wales. While for some private landowners there may be 
interest in the environmental, ecological and social issues still the key motivation was 
considered to be financial. Three funding mechanisms were revealed in interviews; flowage 
easement, full land purchase and Agricultural Schemes funding diffuse storage. Underlying 
these arrangements a clear enforced legal framework of ownership of land and funding 
mechanisms was also viewed as key. The paper will now explain and explore each of these 
facilitation mechanisms in turn revealed from the interviews. 
The Flowage Easement Mechanism 
Flowage easement is the right of government to use the land of another for the purpose of 
overflow, flood and submerge (Strain, 1981). This is usually in perpetuity and the landowner 
retains rights and privileges provided they do not interfere with that flowage. Flowage easement 
was reported by EA respondents to be the primary mechanism of the EA.  
 
In England theEA does not have a legal duty to protect people from flooding but holds 
permissive powers. However, if deemed a regulator then they do have a responsibility. The UK 
Floods and Water Management Act sets a safety regime of standards and inspection for any 
storage capacity over 10,000m³ in Wales and 25,000m³ in England above natural ground level. 
This classifies the structure as a reservoir with regulatory responsibilities undertaken by the EA. 
Flood storage areas below this capacity do not need to be registered or regulated to mitigate 
structural failure.  
Fig 1. Distribution of flood storage areas in England and Wales in 2013 
Fig. 2. Distribution of flood storage capacities in England and Wales in 2013 
Figures 1 illustrates the wide distribution of flood storage schemes in England and Wales with 
the EA the biggest owner of regulated flood storage reservoirs. Analysis of the EA scheme data 
(Figure 2) revealed197 regulated Flood Storage Areas (FSAs) split equally between online and 
offline designs amounting to a total of just over 317million m³ storage capacity above natural 
ground. 114 of these regulated areas are each between 25,000 m³ and 200,001 m³ and 15 
FSAs are over 3 million m³ capacity. The largest is the Ouse Washes at a capacity of 90 million 
m³. Rather than focused on a few very large storage areas this analysis illustrates how the 
approach is adopted at differing scales and geographic spread. 
 
 
The funding approach 
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Until May 2011 with the introduction of the Flood and Coastal Erosion Resilience Partnership 
Funding (Environment Agency, 2012) the dominant resource  for flood defence capital scheme 
funding was from central government. An economic cost / benefit appraisal informed a decision 
if to undertake a scheme. If the forecast economic benefits were sufficiently high when set 
against the economic cost of construction and maintenance for the scheme (ratio set by the 
Treasury) then the scheme could be considered to be funded (Penning-Rowsell et al. 2013). 
From 2011 policy now encourages additional funding contributions from stakeholders with 
central government only providing sufficient capped funds related to the benefits the scheme will 
bring in relation to the social and economic characteristics of the communities benefited. This 
enables schemes falling below the set cast/benefit ratio to still progress provided funds are 
available from sources other than central government. However, it was often reported by the 
respondents that even before the introduction of partnership funding a form of the partnership 
approach was already in practice in some flood storage schemes without which they would not 
have been implemented. The EA usually leads the approach with schemes negotiated and 
implemented organisationally at a local level. A local scale because each storage area is unique 
in terms of the stakeholders, including landowners, at risk; the frequency of flooding and the 
consequences. This means specific national guidance is not possible. However, it is clear from 
EA respondents’ accounts a general negotiated approach with a single compensation payment 
to gain property rights was followed nationally. 
 
Negotiated Approach 
 
It was reported that once it is established from hydrological studies that flood storage is a 
suitable approach for the catchment and following an initial hydrological assessment to define 
the land area affected then the landowners were identified. The amount of water that can be 
released and the capacity downstream dictates the flooded or impounded area of land. 
Invariably flood storage schemes involve a number of landowners; farmers, private landowners, 
local authorities and organisations. Tenant farmers, are not directly affected by the land 
changes and the actual landowners need to be identified and contacted for negotiations. There 
might be wider stakeholder interest in the scheme other than the landowners. Local authority 
interest could be in relation to their flood at-risk communities. Environmental interest groups 
such as the RSPB might see relevant conservation land use change opportunities. There may 
even be commercial interest of being associated with the scheme. It was reported that all of 
these stakeholders can possibly provide partnership funding contributions for a scheme. In 
special cases there may be further legal and political requirements as in the case for large land 
purchases where river navigation is affected such as the Leigh Barrier FSA. Here an Act of 
Parliament was required before work could start (Private Bill River Medway Flood Relief Act 
1976). 
It was revealed that an option open to the EA is a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) which 
legally enables enforced purchase and development of the land against the wishes of the 
landowners. Public betterment as a result of the scheme is required to be legally proven. This 
would also mean owning the impounded land which the EA respondents explained their 
organisation wished to avoid as an organisational liability. It was commented that a CPO 
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immediately adopts a conflictual approach with uncertain outcomes and the possibility of a 
decision being made against the scheme resulting in wasted transaction costs and so public 
money. The EA respondents often highlighted their concern for responsible spending of public 
money. As a consequence, it was reported, the primary mechanism to gain property rights is by 
means of negotiation with the landowners via a combination of limited land purchase and mainly 
flowage easement agreements. This was viewed by respondents as a more constructive 
approach encouraging long term relationships with stakeholders and sustainable participation in 
the scheme. But the CPO remained an option if required because every landowner has to 
participate in order for the required area of land to be secured and a scheme to progress. It was 
commented that the CPO option was made clear to landowners and could act to encourage 
negotiations to come to a conclusion. It was reported negotiations can last many months and 
sometimes years. In one FSA it was commented that a CPO option was explored separately 
and in parallel to negotiations just in case this more aggressive action was required. 
In England and Wales the process of negotiation was organisationally structured. It was found 
that negotiations were undertaken by a specialist EA estates team. Regional Estates 
Leadership Teams were made up of estates managers most of whom had operational surveying 
experience. They were also supported by legal and environmental advisors. This organisational 
arrangement was felt to ensure a consistent approach nationally and enable expertise to be built 
up within the organisation.  
A typical negotiation process reported involved the local area EA staff making first contact with 
landowners individually. The staff might already know the landowners and have knowledge of 
the local context. It was considered by respondents advantageous that landowners were met 
individually rather than as a group because the focus and direction of discussions could be 
changed by a single landowner this not being to the advantage of all the individual landowners. 
Each landowner will have land with different impounding characteristics so the basis of 
negotiation will be different for each. It was advised that the hydrological modelling options 
should be forecast before meeting the landowners because in the respondent’s experience 
there will be an immediate need in initial meetings to understand the detail of what is being 
proposed. Depending on the landowner concerned the modelling consultants were sometimes 
taken to the meetings because iterations to the hydrological forecast models might be required 
based on new information gained in the meeting. This was also thought to communicate a 
responsive and transparent discussion. 
For the financial negotiations the EA encouraged all the landowners to use a single land agent 
who acts on the landowners behalf interacting with the EA Estates Leadership Team. This it 
was thought reduces the transaction costs for the negotiating parties. The basis of negotiations 
depended on the characteristics of the scheme and stakeholders involved. It was reported that 
for farmers conversations might start on the basis of irrigation rather than flood management. 
This was driven by usually the farmers disinterest in flood mitigation per se and particularly 
when benefiting communities may be many kilometres from their property. For landowners the 
proposed land might already be at flood risk and so the scheme could also be negotiated on the 
basis of bringing flood predictability but with compensation. However, it was the EA respondents’ 
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opinion that there is no hiding that flood storage would additionally blight their land and the 
landowners should get a reflection of that in compensation.  
Event Payment vs Single Payment Compensation 
 
Where individual landowners’ flood risk was increased it was reported that a single 
compensatory payment is made at the time of the flood storage scheme construction. It was 
reported that event compensation payments is avoided and very rarely agreed. It was proposed 
by respondents that event compensation is too unpredictable to forecast and negotiate, time 
consuming and expensive to administer, difficult to quality check and the government 
compensatory funding for future events could not be guaranteed into the future. Event 
compensation does not fit well with the costing for the value for money economic analysis and 
could mean that over time the government paying more than the initial value of the land. It was 
also suggested that event compensation dripping down to landowners over long periods of time 
would not provide an opportunity for the landowner to fund a change in their practices or acquire 
new land that an upfront lump sum of money might give.  
It was identified that two forms of land use payment could be negotiated and based on the open 
market land value. This value is driven by local supply and demand based on the agricultural 
land values informed by the land characteristics eg: arable is more valuable than pastureland in 
England. As a principle it was stated that the EA do not pay more than the capital value of the 
land. It was reported that for some landowners a small portion of their land is bought outright. 
This is the footprint of proposed scheme embankments, sluices, gates, intakes and outfalls that 
regulate the use of the flood storage area. It also includes land that allows access by the 
maintenance organisation to these structures. It was reported that the EA accepted liability for 
these structures as the regulator inspecting and maintaining them. As guidance to appraise the 
whole life cost of a scheme the maintenance cost was suggested to be three times the 
construction cost over 100 years. The construction costs included designed in climate change. 
Another approach suggested was to calculate the cost as including a mid-life rebuild and two 
refurbishments during a 50 year life of the asset.  
For the rest of the land which would form the majority of the impounded storage area flowage 
easements were negotiated with the relevant landowners. It was reported that the negotiated 
price was based on the possible frequency of flooding and proportion of land affected. This can 
be calculated based on flood return periods of one in 2, 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 100, 200 year flood 
events. For most catchments an average over the year was calculated because the flooding 
could occur at any time of year. The amount paid for the easement was based on a negotiated 
diminution in the value of the land normally as a percentage of the market value varying by the 
frequency of flooding. The less frequent the flooding the lower the diminution in market value. 
An example is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1 Example of the diminution in land value (Lincoln Flood Alleviation Scheme 1998) 
It was reported that the rates are not set nationally and vary according to the region, type of 
scheme, topography, predominant land use (arable or pasture), estimated duration of flooding 
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etc. Observed by one EA respondent,  a large number of diminutions can potentially cause 
confusion for some landowners during the negotiation. So another approach that was suggested 
would model just two scenarios. A 1 in 5 year return period negotiated at 25% of the land value 
(as in Table 1) and any less frequent flood frequencies negotiating at 10% of the land value. For 
annual inundation it was thought the EA would probably pay the full market value but not above 
that value.  
It was apparent from respondents’ discourse that negotiations are based on hydrological 
forecasts which are uncertain (Beven et al. 2014). But asked if uncertainty entered negotiations 
it was commented by the EA respondents that forecasts are made conservatively in the 
landowners favour and the offers were felt to be generous. However, in the very few cases 
where the forecasts were fundamentally wrong the EA would renegotiate but not paying more 
than the capital value of the land. It was pointed out that sometimes land agents would like to 
include a clause for smaller variations in the forecast that inconvenienced their clients but when 
challenged with counter clauses for variations in favour of the EA this course of negotiation was 
abandoned by the agents. Overall it was stated that there was little option for recourse to 
negotiated compensation unless circumstances were exceptionally different from forecast and 
the emphasis would be for the landowner to prove that difference.  
Negotiated Agreements 
 
Agreements were reported to be structured around the characteristics of the local stakeholders 
(past relationship, ownership, negotiating manner), their requirements and flood experience. In 
one FSA the local authority agreed to pay for a community swimming pool to compensate the 
community for lost historic bathing amenity within the flood storage area. But in that case the 
cost was not included as part of the project cost. ‘Accommodation works’ or supplementary work 
as it is termed by respondents might be offered to the landowner as compensation in kind which 
include the improvement of farm roads, the development of irrigation ponds from construction 
borrow pits or undertaking grass cutting and planting maintenance. The project cost might be 
supplemented by other stakeholders such as the RSPB to develop some wetland in the storage 
area. It was reported the EA also attempted to build environmental amenity into their schemes 
to meet their environmental goals. It was suggested by most respondents that a comprehensive 
record of agreements and meeting minutes is kept because there are often enquiries from 
landowners regarding the details sometime well after the FSA was built. The EA interest in the 
FSA following completion was with regard to their regulatory responsibilities, agreements to 
maintenance and the operation of gates if they were not automated. As part of the flowage 
easement the EA would be required to be consulted by the landowner if restrictions on land use 
change are considered and might interfere with impounding . The EA undertakes event related 
Project Appraisal Reports following construction to evaluate the initial cost benefit assessment.  
It was commented that overall the outcomes had been very good and as predicted if not better. 
In terms of organising negotiations the sequencing and grouping of stakeholders was important. 
It was also thought that where whole livelihoods could be disrupted by storage then outright 
purchase of the land or land swaps was preferable to a negotiated or event driven 
compensation approach.  
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Where Purchase of the Land Outright was Preferred 
By this mechanism of gaining property rights the whole FSA was purchased included the 
impounded land. Apart from the CPO approach in negotiation already described this approach 
was adopted where far greater control of the land use was required and accepting liability of the 
land was viewed as an advantage. It was reported by the RSPB respondents that land use 
change was the key driver in their organisational interest of restoring habitat. So the main 
mechanism undertaken by that particular organisation. The drivers to influence outcomes in 
land use and in addition to being an influential partner in flood storage scheme planning. It was 
reported that the RSPB actively looked for opportunities to return wildlife to areas where it had 
been lost. Washland, wet grassland, water meadows, marshes and fens were reported as key 
habitats which are in short supply in the UK and so if there was a requirement to create wetland 
hence the association with flood storage. The organisation viewed flood risk as an opportunity to 
develop habitat. 
It was reported that the RSPB managed at the time of research some 130,000 hectors of land 
as the land owner or lease holders where the previous owner or new tenant had an interest in 
the land. The organisation had 2000 staff and a large volunteer workforce. The RSPB was 
structured so that there was a Reserves Team who attempted to identify suitable land. To do 
this they were in close contact with local organisations to reveal opportunities as well as 
scanning catchment flood management plans, shoreline management plans and flood defence 
asset maintenance. Their Regional Teams took an overview of activities. Similar to the EA the 
RSPB also had a ‘land agency team’ who undertook negotiations and their environmental 
services could sometimes be offered as part of negotiated flood storage deals based on market 
values.  
It was commented that a key driver for land sale was often that the landowner already expended 
money on flood defence or the management of flooding of their inundated wet land. Some 
landowners still wished to manage the land and so maintain an interest as tenants but used the 
capital from the sale of their land to buy more suitable farmland. The organisation had an annual 
land acquisition budget but did not undertake cost benefit assessments of a scheme. They 
instead drew on expert opinion of the wildlife contribution set against annual plans. Alternatively 
to land purchase the RSPB could also be partners in an EA scheme and explored smaller 
opportunities within the schemes. Such opportunities could include landscaping to improve 
habitats that avoided impact on storage capacity. The RSPB respondents reported their 
increasing awareness of the conflict between habitat creation and the functionality of flood 
storage. There had been an increase in the frequency of summer as well as winter flooding 
which could coincide with ground nesting birds like the lapwing. Flood water destroys the nests 
endangering the next generation of birds. However, localised landscaping raising possible nest 
sites within the inundation area was suggested as a possible mitigation measure with little 
impact to the storage capacity. 
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Compensating for new land management practices  
The third mechanism does not involve land purchase or flowage easement agreements but 
encouraging landowners to undertake their own ideas for flood storage activities. These are 
smaller scale approaches than those already described each falling well below the 10,000 m³ 
capacity reservoir registration and regulation. The largest of these schemes was reported to be 
a capacity of 6,500 m³. However, landowners could undertake a number of mixed approaches 
spread across their land and across a number of stakeholders’ land resulting in a cumulative 
effect on storage and flow slowing in the catchment. Compared to the previous approaches 
where the whole storage land was impounded here patches of the land was affected which we 
have termed diffuse storage.  
A comprehensive description of a project by the Staffordshire Wildlife Trust that trialled this 
approach is Farming Floodplains for the Future (Jones, 2010). Interviews with respondents 
involved in this project revealed again that landowner participation was driven by compensatory 
payments to recover financial costs incurred excluding volunteered time. Payments covered the 
single capital cost of the asset, its maintenance and additional small compensation payments. 
The approaches were mostly sluices, scrapes, spillways, flap valves, ponds and woodland 
operating at low exceedance probabilities requiring very little maintenance. It was reported that 
guidance was provided to the landowners and project team by the RSPB. However, it was 
commented that the wildlife restoration value was not very great because the patch size (wildlife 
restored area) was small for each application which increased edge effects and so reduced 
conservation restoration.  
Funding was sourced from securing additional farming subsidy payments (Entry and Higher 
Level Stewardship schemes). The landowners involved were already part of subsidy schemes 
and so familiar with the process. It was thought that the life of a scheme could be dependent on 
the life of the subsidy. Without any legal agreements and with the potential loss of funding there 
were concerns that maintenance would cease reintroducing the previous level of flood risk. It 
was thought that using flowage easements as a solution to the loss of funding would not be 
appropriate proving too expensive for the low capacity of storage in each section of land 
requiring an agreement.  
Rather than being driven by achieving a defined capacity of storage linked to acquiring 
particular property rights in this approach a catchment of landowners were encouraged or pulled 
into the scheme through building awareness and trust. It was reported that not all the possible 
landowners participated in this project. But based on the Trust’s experience they achieved a 
good level of attendance at local Landowner Day events (supported by the National Farmers 
Union and the Country Land and Business Association) of 10% of those invited. Over the three 
project years around eight schemes were delivered the majority of which were suggested early 
in the project by the landowners themselves. The local media was used but word of mouth and 
landowners who championed the project helped. A guided walk around a scheme already in 
operation was found to be an effective recruitment mechanism of prospective landowners. This 
approach provided time for discussion with the landowners about the benefits of participating.  
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Due to resource restrictions the strategy for this project was to work with those landowners who 
were interested to get involved. The project officer needed the hydrological modelling, 
negotiation and construction skills to design and help the landowner realise their plans. Also the 
total flood storage capacity was dependent upon landowner participation and the level of 
mitigation strategies employed. The ‘right catchment’ was reported to be required where 
conventional flood storage costs were too expensive but a range of solutions could be employed 
to generate sufficient capacity to have an impact. It was also suggested that getting landowners 
engaged was sometimes more important than their individual storage contribution because their 
involvement could generate further landowner interest. Although financially less demanding the 
approach required time, particular skills and was less predictable in storage capacity outcome or 
sustainability.  
Discussion  
The paper has focused on flood mitigation that challenges property rights in the form of flood 
storage creation with the economic and financial mechanisms to facilitate resolution. It is 
certainly the case that England and Wales have had a successful campaign of implementing 
flood storage with a focus on the upstream affected stakeholders rather than upstream 
downstream stakeholder relationship building. Rather, as suggested in the literature, 
organisations take on the role of bridging the divide between upstream and downstream source 
and receptors allocation of funding and management. However, those organisations are driven 
by their own organisational agendas. 
The key driver for private landowner involvement in flood storage approaches was reported to 
be predominantly financial.  
Compulsory purchase can be employed but a ‘negotiated’ process was reportedly preferred. 
Recognising that financial incentives are the key drivers these are combined with negotiation 
within a framework of scientific and financial discourse. This is undertaken while attempting to 
establish and maintain relationships between the organisations and the landowners required to 
ensure implementation of future and perhaps differing land management issues. This appears 
to be a valued balance by those responsible organisations reflected in their commitment to the 
transaction costs required. Equally for landowners fairness through the reduction of uncertainty 
via the negotiation process also appears valued.  
As an alternative approach in Australian flood mitigation strategies has been the development of 
using mechanisms in the urban setting of inverse leasehold. This approach attempts to link 
upstream mitigation and downstream transferable development rights. In a similar way to the 
main approach revealed in this research landowner rights and privileges are preserved only 
deferred for the period the land is physically required for inundation. However, in downstream 
localities often inchoate development rights imbedded in land are preserved through the transfer 
of development rights to other less-impacted properties in adjacent or nearby low risk zones. 
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The paper highlights the important role of private landowners in successful implementation of 
storing water in the headwaters. Success depends on understanding the best approaches from 
a landowners’ perspective to motivate initial and continued cooperation. Further research is 
required to explore the interaction between the hydrological issues, governance arrangements, 
legal and stakeholder contexts at different catchment scales to clarify both opportunities and 
challenges for successful flood storage implementation. By way of example the main approach 
applied in England and Wales requires relational strategies with private landowners at the local 
scale in a context of clear and enforced property rights and funding. This may not be the case in 
all countries and different approaches need to be explored. 
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Fig 1. Distribution of flood storage areas in England and Wales in 2013 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of flood storage capacities in England and Wales in 2013 
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Flood Return Period   Diminution in capital value 
1 in 2 years       100% 
1 in 5 years         75% 
1 in 10 years         60% 
1 in 25 years         35% 
1 in 50 years         20% 
1 in 75 years         15% 
1 in 100 years          10% 
 
Table 1 Example of the diminution in land value (Lincoln Flood Alleviation Scheme 1998) 
 
 
